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ARTICLE
COMPELLING MERCY: JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE CLEMENCY POWER
PROFESSOR DANIEL T. KOBIL*
When I first began writing about pardons and commutations in 1991, I
looked to the judiciary to improve the clemency process: “[the courts] can
and should use judicial review to ensure that the executive is using the
clemency power constitutionally.”1 I believed that judicial review of clem-
ency was necessary for two reasons. First, federal statistics showed an
alarming decline in the number of pardons and commutations granted by
presidents, suggesting that there was a need to look to the courts to help
“reinvigorate” the power.2 Second, clemency decisions can potentially vio-
late Equal Protection or Due Process principles, but without judicial review
there is little to prevent even blatant constitutional violations by
executives.3
Today, the need for reform of the federal clemency process is even
more apparent. The miserly clemency practices of Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama make clemency advocates long for the relative
generosity of Presidents Carter and Reagan.4 There is also a compelling
case to be made that the Justice Department’s advisory function has been
captured—and ultimately undermined—by federal prosecutors who are pri-
marily interested in ensuring that sentences be carried out, and rarely miti-
gated.5 And suggestions that racial discrimination could infect the clemency
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. I would like to thank the University of
St. Thomas Law Journal and Professor Mark Osler for organizing this timely, stimulating sympo-
sium on the clemency power. I would also especially like to thank Esther Barrett for her invalua-
ble assistance with the researching and writing of this article.
1. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 620 (1991).
2. Id. at 603.
3. Id. at 617.
4. President Carter received 1581 pardon and 1046 commutation requests during his presi-
dency. He granted 534 pardons and 32 commutations. President Reagan received 2099 pardon and
1305 commutation requests. He granted 393 pardons and 13 commutations. Id. at 640.
5. Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the Henhouse?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP.
177, 178 (2001); Daniel T. Kobil, Reviving Presidential Clemency in Cases of “Unfortunate
Guilt,” 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 160, 163 (2009).
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process are no longer hypothetical. A U.S. pardon attorney has left his post
and retired after making racially-biased remarks about a clemency appli-
cant.6 Even more troubling is a study of presidential pardons demonstrating
that in recent years racial disparity mars the clemency process, with whites
being more than four times more likely to receive pardons than minorities.7
At the state level, concerns about whether clemency procedures comport
with due process of law are pervasive.8
Given such ongoing problems, it is time to revisit whether the courts
should be asked to intervene in clemency matters. Judges, both state and
federal, are understandably reluctant to interfere with the decisions of other
branches about whether to grant or deny clemency. There are also serious
questions about whether judicial review would, in the end, improve the
quality of clemency decision making. In this essay, I examine the argu-
ments commonly advanced against judicial review of clemency issues, and
conclude that they are unpersuasive. I also explore the circumstances under
which the courts should intervene to invalidate grants of clemency or de-
clare specific procedures unconstitutional. Although there are legitimate
concerns that judicial review could contribute to further atrophy of the
power, I believe that where due process and equal protection guarantees are
being eroded by arbitrary or discriminatory clemency practices, or funda-
mental rights are infringed by unconstitutional conditions, there is a role for
the courts to play. However, there is little that the courts can do to promote
more robust exercise of the clemency power by governors or presidents
who are reluctant to use their authority.
I. CONSTITUTIONALLY DERIVED SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
The argument that judicial intervention violates separation of powers
principles is a significant hurdle that must be overcome in any effort to
involve the courts in overseeing grants or denials of clemency. This consti-
tutionally derived separation of powers assertion (i.e., “the judiciary can
never consider the propriety of a clemency decision or process”) is distinct
from a prudential refusal to consider specific clemency issues based on pol-
icy considerations (“it is unwise for the courts to decide this particular is-
sue, although it is within their constitutional authority”).9
The Mississippi Supreme Court in In re Hooker recently held that it
was bound by constitutional separation of powers principles to reject a chal-
6. Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, A Racial Gap for Criminals Seeking Mercy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 2011, at A01.
7. Id.
8. See discussion and cases cited infra Part III.D.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 31–33 (discussing some of the policy considerations
that could impel courts to choose not to review clemency matters as a prudential matter).
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lenge to controversial grants of clemency made by outgoing Governor
Haley Barbour.10 In Hooker, a majority of the court held that:
a facially valid pardon, issued by the governor—in whom our
[c]onstitution vests the chief-executive power of this state, and
who is the head of the coequal executive branch of government—
may not be set aside or voided by the judicial branch, based solely
on a claim that the procedural publication requirement of [the
state constitution] was not met . . . .11
Despite plausible assertions that Governor Barbour had failed to comply
with mandatory constitutional language regarding the publication of pardon
applications, the Hooker majority ruled that it simply could not review such
executive action owing to constitutionally derived separation of powers
principles.12
Those who ask courts to apply federal constitutional principles to the
clemency process could well be required to address a similar separation of
powers argument. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has at times hinted that
the federal judiciary lacks the constitutional authority to interfere in any
way with the exercise of the clemency power. In United States v. Klein, the
Supreme Court held that Congress, and implicitly the judiciary as well,
could not interfere with the president’s power to pardon: “It is the intention
of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the
government—the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—shall be, in
its sphere, independent of the others. To the executive alone is intrusted the
power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”13 More recently, some
members of the Court have suggested that the judiciary should never be
involved with clemency, employing broad language reminiscent of Hooker
that could be read as immunizing federal and state clemency processes from
any type of judicial intervention. Chief Justice Burger, rejecting an attempt
to compel a grant of state clemency on due process grounds, observed in
dicta that “pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been
the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects
for judicial review.”14 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for four Justices in
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, would have ruled that clemency,
as a matter of “grace” rather than a legitimate claim of entitlement, is not
subject to judicial review for alleged violations of due process.15 As Justice
Stevens characterized Chief Justice Rehnquist’s approach, even clemency
proceedings “infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or the de-
10. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 401–14.
13. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871).
14. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (emphasis added).
15. 523 U.S. 272, 284–85 (1998).
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liberate fabrication of false evidence would be constitutionally
acceptable.”16
However, a majority of the Supreme Court has not embraced such a
“hands off” approach to judicial involvement in clemency matters. In
Woodard, Justice O’Connor, joined by four other Justices, acknowledged
that the clemency process could sometimes trigger due process review by
the courts:
I do not, however, agree . . . that, because clemency is committed
to the discretion of the executive, the Due Process Clause pro-
vides no constitutional safeguards. . . . [A]lthough it is true that
“pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been
the business of courts,” . . . some minimal procedural safeguards
apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial intervention might, for
example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state
official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or
in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access
to its clemency process.17
In Schick v. Reed,18 the Court likewise had no difficulty reaching the
merits of the petitioner’s argument that his commutation exceeded the pres-
ident’s power to pardon. Although the majority upheld the validity of Presi-
dent Eisenhower’s conditional commutation, none of the Justices suggested
that the very act of reviewing the validity of an act of clemency violates
constitutionally derived separation of powers principles. Indeed, the Court
stated repeatedly that the president could attach to a grant of clemency a
condition “which does not otherwise offend the Constitution.”19 The most
direct means of enforcing such a limitation on the clemency power is, of
course, judicial review.20
Perhaps the clearest support for the proposition that the judiciary pos-
sesses the authority to review the validity of clemency grants comes from
several early decisions of the Supreme Court. In United States v. Wilson,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote for a unanimous Court that a pardon could be
rejected by a recipient, or even “controverted by the prosecutor, and [then]
expounded by the court.”21 Likewise, in Ex parte Grossman,22 the Court
reviewed, without questioning its authority to do so, the validity of a presi-
dential pardon issued to one imprisoned for criminal contempt of court.
Although Grossman ultimately upheld the pardon being challenged,
the Court actually invalidated a presidential pardon in Burdick v. United
16. Id. at 290–91.
17. Id. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).
18. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
19. Id. at 264, 266–67.
20. Impeachment or other sorts of political checks are alternative means of deterring uncon-
stitutional clemency grants.
21. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833) (emphasis added).
22. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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States.23 In Burdick, a newspaper editor, relying on his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, refused to reveal to a federal grand jury
his sources for a story exposing corruption in the U.S. Customs Office. In
order to eliminate the possibility of prosecution and thus frustrate the edi-
tor’s claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, President Wilson issued a pardon
covering any federal crimes Burdick may have committed in connection
with the article.24 The Court, however, saw this as an instance of the pardon
power infringing on Burdick’s Fifth Amendment right, and held that the
Court’s responsibility was “to preserve both,—to leave to each its proper
place.”25 In order to protect Burdick’s Fifth Amendment privilege, the
Court held that the pardon, because it had been refused by Burdick, did not
“becom[e] effective,” and declared Wilson’s grant of clemency invalid.26
This unbroken practice of the Court deciding matters pertaining to ex-
ercise of the clemency power suggests that it is unlikely that separation of
powers principles would be deemed to place clemency issues categorically
beyond the reach of the federal judiciary.27 There is no insurmountable con-
stitutional barrier to asking the courts to intervene regarding clemency.28
However, those who would reform the clemency process using judicial re-
view must also consider whether it is desirable to ask courts to oversee
clemency, and if so, what sorts of requests for judicial involvement would
most likely succeed?
23. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
24. Id. at 85–87.
25. Id. at 93–94.
26. Id. at 94. Interestingly, the Court refused to follow the reasoning of Burdick in a later
case, Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927). In Biddle, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
held that a grant of commutation was effective even if the recipient of the commutation had not
consented to the imposition of a lesser punishment (life imprisonment instead of hanging). Id. at
487–88. In such a case, Holmes reasoned that the grant of clemency, like punishment itself, could
be imposed regardless of the will of the prisoner, and that the reasoning of Burdick was not “to be
extended to the present case.” Id. at 488. However, Justice Holmes did not question the Burdick
Court’s authority to review grants of presidential clemency, and implicitly affirmed that power by
reviewing Perovich’s claim that his commutation was invalid. Thus, Biddle actually is consistent
with Burdick insofar as judicial review is concerned.
27. This is not to say the separation of powers issues could never arise in a clemency case.
For example, if the courts were asked to order the issuance of a pardon to a particular person, it is
quite possible that this would be deemed to violate constitutionally derived separation of powers
principles. Indeed, it was a claim that certain prisoners had a constitutionally protected interest in
obtaining commutations that brought the Court closest to washing its hands of clemency matters
entirely in Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). However, short of a
litigant seeking a comparably extraordinary intrusion on the clemency authority, it seems that
courts would consider constitutional issues that arise in the context of clemency.
28. But see Graham v. Angelone, 73 F. Supp. 2d 629 (E.D. Va. 1999) (stating that a clem-
ency petition directed to the governor of Virginia is not subject to judicial review based on separa-
tion of powers and Tenth Amendment principles).
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II. IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLEMENCY ISSUES DESIRABLE?
From the perspective of those who wish to see clemency function ef-
fectively as a release and restoration of rights mechanism, it might seem
obvious that judicial review of flawed clemency processes is desirable. Af-
ter all, executives are not inclined to fix clemency mechanisms even when
they appear to be broken. Despite widespread criticism of the Office of the
Pardon Attorney, President Obama abandoned initial efforts to reform fed-
eral clemency practices.29 Likewise, state executives seldom devote much
attention to the clemency process until the end of their term, by which time
it is impractical to implement measures to improve the administration of
clemency.30 Courts potentially offer an attractive alternative to the inatten-
tion of chief executives.
Nevertheless, there are plausible reasons why, for matters of policy,
one might object to judicial review of clemency matters. A number of these
objections are related less to clemency per se than to normative assumptions
about the proper role of the courts in our government. For example, some
observers might object to judicial review of presidential clemency acts be-
cause of an underlying commitment to the theory of a unitary executive
akin to that voiced by Justice Scalia in his separation of powers jurispru-
dence.31 Under such a view, the President alone should have complete and
final say over all matters of executive authority, including clemency. Like-
wise, a strong belief in the importance of federalism may cause others to
conclude that federal courts, at least, should decline to review any state
clemency issues out of respect for state sovereignty. Judge Posner ex-
pressed this philosophical reluctance to review state clemency procedures in
Bowens v. Quinn, a case in which the court refused to order the Governor of
Illinois to issue clemency decisions in a timely manner:
We therefore balk at the idea of federal judges’ setting timetables
for action on clemency petitions by state governors.
29. Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 6.
30. The experience of Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste is typical. Celeste, by his own
admission, thought little about clemency until shortly before he was leaving office in 1991, at
which time he lacked key advisors to help him administer clemency in a coherent fashion. Richard
F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive’s Real Life Decisions, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 139,
139 (2003) (“[T]he clemency power is in many respects the most unencumbered power enjoyed
by a Governor. It is also the one for which there is the least training or preparation. When I was
first elected and went to the new Governors course . . . there was no hour devoted to this responsi-
bility and no required reading. Nor did anyone take me aside to offer good advice on this as they
did on everything from relations with legislative leadership to handling the Federal reforms of
CETA.”).
31. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is not for us
to determine, and we have never presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive pow-
ers of government must be within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that
they all are.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The insistence of the
Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive—to insure both vigor and accountability—is well
known.”).
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. . . Federal courts have run prisons, school systems, police and
fire departments, and other state and local agencies found to have
engaged in unconstitutional conduct. But for a federal court to run
a governor’s pardon system would be a step too far.32
It might also be argued that reviewing an act of clemency presents a
non-justiciable political question that should not be decided by the courts.33
These arguments are surely important, but their resolution hinges on
fundamental jurisprudential principles that have long been debated and are
not unique to clemency.34 Thus, a detailed assessment of federalism princi-
ples or considerations of judicial restraint would take us far afield from
clemency. Instead, I would like to consider why those who care about the
proper functioning of clemency should think carefully before involving the
courts.
First, judicial review of clemency could undermine one of the key ad-
vantages of the federal clemency model: the undivided responsibility placed
in the hands of the executive encourages a sense of care and scrupulousness
in making clemency decisions that might be lost if the responsibility were
shared with the courts. The federal constitutional approach, which is also
commonly employed by the states,35 vests the chief executive with plenary
responsibility to make clemency decisions. Thus, it is the president or gov-
ernor alone who is given the responsibility of deciding whether clemency is
deserved in a particular case. Alexander Hamilton saw this vesting of the
clemency power in the president as one of the strengths of the Constitution:
32. 561 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2009).
33. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 224 (1993) (refusing to review constitutional-
ity of Senate impeachment procedure for prudential reasons); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 287
(1962) (determining that the Constitution has assigned certain provisions to be enforced by the
other branches of government, and that when such a constitutional provision is at issue, the Court
will refuse to hear the case on the grounds that it is a non-justiciable political question). For an
insightful discussion of the political question issues that could arise in the context of clemency,
see Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United
States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 138–43 (2002).
34. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We The
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court has overstepped its bounds
from judicial review to judicial sovereignty); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing against judicial review from a standpoint
that the practice is “democratically illegitimate”). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Em-
peror’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1069 (2006) (asserting that rhetoric regarding “discretion-free” judicial review does not fit with
reality).
35. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL
CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 22–36 (2006). There are three basic models
for dispensing clemency. States most commonly give the governor the ultimate authority to make
clemency decisions, often with the assistance of an administrative agency. Id. at 23. Some states
have a “hybrid” system where the governor exercises the clemency power only after prior ap-
proval by an administrative board. Id. at 28–29. A handful of states give the clemency authority to
an independent board of gubernatorial appointees. Id. at 23–26.
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As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as
it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be
most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might
plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield
to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of
its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature de-
pended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness
and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or conni-
vance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different
kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from
their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of
obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspi-
cion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these
accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the
mercy of the government, than a body of men.36
The considerations expressed in Federalist No. 74 have special force
when clemency is sought in a death penalty case, where the defendant often
wants a governor or president to wrestle with his or her conscience as to the
“fate of a fellow-creature.”37 The prospect of judicial review might cause
executives to be less inclined to make a difficult, politically charged deci-
sion to commute a questionable death sentence or to pardon a criminal con-
victed of a heinous crime, instead hoping to pass these responsibilities on to
the courts. It is also plausible that the prospect of judicial review could
cause an executive to be less careful in dispensing clemency, confident that
the courts will “clean up” any mistakes.
However, I am not convinced that the division of responsibility argu-
ment should cause clemency advocates to forego completely the option of
seeking judicial review. There certainly would seem to be no reason for
such restraint in the federal system where judicial review is already estab-
lished.38 Moreover, Hamilton’s vision of the president wrestling in solitary
fashion with each clemency decision is now a pipe dream: everyday clem-
ency decisions are made by the Office of the Pardon Attorney, which can
(and does) reject most clemency applications before anyone in the White
House sees them.39 Thus, responsibility for making clemency decisions is
already effectively divided, at least within the executive branch. Occasional
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
37. It is my personal recollection that the possible loss of this sense of undivided responsibil-
ity by the governor was one of the factors that prompted the section 1983 challenge of the state’s
proposed clemency procedures in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
Having been consulted by attorneys who challenged the new procedure prior to the filing of the
case, one concern that was expressed was that if the Adult Parole Authority made recommenda-
tions to the governor early on, before execution was imminent, the governor might be more in-
clined to deny clemency summarily and wash his hands of the matter, hoping to pass the final “life
or death” decision on to the judiciary.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 17–27.
39. Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 6.
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judicial review of the clemency process would be unlikely to lead to a
greater degree of atrophy than currently exists.
At the state level, nothing suggests that the absence of judicial review
in a particular jurisdiction means that governors are more likely to grant
clemency. For example, California law does not allow the courts to review
the Governor’s clemency decisions.40 Yet no California governor has com-
muted a death sentence since 1976.41 Ohio, on the other hand, does allow
the courts to review and actually invalidate grants of clemency.42 However,
this prospect does not seem to have deterred governors from granting clem-
ency in controversial cases involving capital punishment. Overall, Ohio’s
governors have granted eight commutations of death sentences since 2008,
the most of any state apart from Illinois, which abolished the death penalty
in 2011.43 Moreover, since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, Ohio’s
governors have granted about one commutation for every three people exe-
cuted, the highest ratio of clemency in an active death penalty state.44 If the
prospect of judicial review actually decreased the willingness of governors
to grant clemency in controversial cases, one would expect to find few
grants of clemency from Ohio’s governors.
The second reason advanced for rejecting judicial review is more com-
pelling: it will inevitably result in the invalidation of some pardons and
commutations. This is a legitimate concern with regard to a power that is in
danger of atrophying in many jurisdictions, including the federal system. In
Hooker,45 the refusal of the court to review any of Governor Barbour’s
grants of clemency meant that all 215 grants of clemency remained intact.46
However, if the dissenters’ approach had prevailed, there is a significant
likelihood that Mississippi courts would have invalidated some or all of the
40. People v. Ansell, 24 P.3d 1174, 1189 (Cal. 2001) (stating that pardon decisions are dis-
cretionary and rest ultimately with the governor); Jenkins v. Knight, 293 P.2d 6, 8 (Cal. 1956)
(holding that the judiciary will not interfere with the governor’s performance of political or execu-
tive acts that involve “the exercise of judgment or discretion” such as pardons).
41. Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
clemency (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (listing grants of clemency in capital cases).
42. State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 644 N.E.2d 369, 379 (Ohio 1994) (invalidating pardon
of Governor Richard F. Celeste).
43. See Clemency, supra note 41.
44. See State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). The Death Penalty Information website
shows that Ohio has had 48 executions and 16 commutations since 1976. Id. By contrast, during
the same period, California has had 13 executions and 0 commutations, Virginia has had 109
executions and 8 commutations, Florida has had 73 executions and 6 grants of clemency, while
Texas has had 488 executions and a meager 2 commutations. Id.
45. 87 So. 3d 401 (Miss. 2012).
46. Id. at 403, 414. According to news reports, Barbour pardoned 198 people on Jan. 10,
2012, shortly before ending his second term as governor. Emily Wagster Pettus, 16 Pardoned by
Barbour After Parole Board Said No, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at 06C. “He also granted
13 medical releases; one suspension of sentence; one conditional, indefinite suspension of sen-
tence; and one conditional clemency.” Id.
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pardons and commutations that the Governor had granted without comply-
ing with the publication requirements of the Mississippi Constitution.47
Certainly, if courts have the power to review grants of clemency, they
will sometimes declare pardons and commutations invalid. As the previous
discussion of Burdick48 demonstrates, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified a
presidential grant of clemency. Likewise, in State ex rel. Maurer v.
Sheward,49 the Ohio Supreme Court declared void a pardon granted by
Governor Richard F. Celeste because the Governor had not followed the
procedure set forth in the Ohio Constitution. The court stated that “[a]n
attempted pardon that is granted without adherence to constitutionally au-
thorized requirements is invalid and is not immune to challenge.”50 Other
courts have also been willing to invalidate grants of clemency.51
Thus, by urging judicial review of clemency matters, I cannot deny
that I am also opening the door to the rejection of desirable grants of clem-
ency. For those who, like Professor Doug Berman, believe there is “no such
thing as a bad grant of clemency,”52 judicial review is undoubtedly danger-
ous: it will result in the overturning of some commutations and pardons,
and could be employed to set aside politically unpopular decisions like the
Hooker grants, nearly twenty percent of which went to murderers and sex
offenders.53
However, this concern does not justify rejecting judicial review cate-
gorically. I do not agree with Professor Berman that every grant of clem-
ency is necessarily “good.” Though I am troubled, like Professor Berman,
47. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 439 (Randolph, J., dissenting) (stating that “the circuit court
would determine whether the State has overcome the presumption of validity” and presumably
invalidate grants of clemency that did not satisfy the publication requirement).
48. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
49. 644 N.E.2d 369, 379 (Ohio 1994).
50. Id. at 373.
51. See, e.g., Horton v. Gillespie, 279 S.W. 1020, 1025 (Ark. 1926) (invalidating a pardon
issued by the acting governor for failing to follow the correct procedure for granting pardons);
Dover v. Bickle, 285 S.W. 386, 388 (Ark. 1926) (same); People ex rel. Garrison v. Lamm, 622
P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. App. 1980) (invalidating a pardon issued by the lieutenant governor of Colo-
rado while the governor was absent for failing to follow the proper procedure); State v. Dunning,
9 Ind. 20, 23 (Ind. 1857) (invalidating the remittance of a fine for failing to follow a statute that
required the application for remission to be accompanied by statements of opinion by state of-
ficers on the propriety of remitting the fine); Jamison v. Flanner, 228 P. 82, 99 (Kan. 1924)
(invalidating Kansas governor’s pardon for failing to follow notice procedure required for pardons
under the state constitution); State ex. rel. Maurer, 644 N.E. 2d at 379 (invalidating Ohio governor
Richard F. Celeste’s pardon for failure to follow state constitutionally mandated procedure); see
also Gulley v. Budd, 189 S.W.2d 385, 389–90 (Ark. 1945) (holding that the court has the power
to invalidate a pardon obtained from the governor under fraudulent pretenses since there is no
procedure for the governor to do so); Rathbun v. Baumel, 191 N.W. 297, 299 (Iowa 1922) (same).
52. Professor Douglas Berman, Address at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal Spring
Symposium: Sentence Commutations and the Executive Pardon Power (Apr. 20, 2012).
53. Jay Newton-Small, Haley Barbour’s Pardons: Why No One in Mississippi Is in a Forgiv-
ing Mood, TIME, Jan. 13, 2012, available at http://swampland.time.com/2012/01/13/haley-
barbours-pardons-why-no-one-in-mississippi-is-in-a-forgiving-mood/.
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by the general unwillingness of executives to use the clemency power, I
believe that it may occasionally be appropriate for the courts to overturn
pardons or commutations. Certainly it is possible to identify some clemency
grants that have been predicated on bad information or that might, in rare
circumstances, have been deemed dangerous. Judicial invalidation of such
grants, if done with care, could actually strengthen the clemency power by
increasing public confidence in its exercise.
For instance, a pardon issued by Governor Barbour to Harry R. Bos-
tick is extremely troubling. While Bostick’s pardon application was pend-
ing for his third DUI, a felony, Bostick committed a fourth DUI and in the
process killed an eighteen-year-old woman. Nonetheless, Governor Barbour
inexplicably granted Bostick’s pardon just three months later:
Of all the pardons issued by Mr. Barbour, the case involving
Harry R. Bostick, first disclosed by a blogger in Oxford, Miss.,
Tom Freeland, may be the most confounding.
Mr. Bostick, a former criminal investigator for the I.R.S.,
was sentenced in May 2010 for his third drunken driving of-
fense—a felony—and ordered into treatment.
. . . .
In October [2011], Mr. Bostick, 55, was arrested again for
drunken driving, this time in an accident that left an 18-year-old
waitress dead. The waitress, Charity Smith, was working at
Cracker Barrel to save money for college. On a Friday night, her
Buick collided with Mr. Bostick’s truck.
Mr. Bostick was charged with his fourth D.U.I. On Jan. 10,
[2012,] he was pardoned for his prior felony D.U.I. by Mr.
Barbour.54
Judicial invalidation of Bostick’s pardon, if it had been accomplished
in a manner consistent with the rule of law, would have likely improved
public confidence in clemency and may have prompted future governors to
be more careful than Barbour, whose sloppy clemency practices prompted
Mississippians to consider abolishing the clemency power altogether.55
Similarly, in my view, it was not a mistake for the U.S. Supreme Court
in Burdick56 to invalidate the pardon tendered by President Wilson in order
to get around the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment protections in-
voked by a member of the press. As I will discuss more fully below, the
pardon power cannot be exercised in a manner that violates fundamental
constitutional rights. Few would defend a presidential pardon issued on
condition that the recipient agree to vote for the president’s party in all
54. Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A1.
55. Sid Salter, Pardon Me?, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at 17A.
56. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
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future elections, or donate one million dollars to the president’s reelection
campaign.
Thus, it is not the invalidation of clemency per se that is problematical.
The principal danger presented by judicial invalidation is that the courts
will overreach, aggressively infringing on use of the clemency power and
thereby constricting an already atrophied appendage of executive authority.
For example, if the Mississippi Supreme Court had thrown out Bostick’s
pardon, would they also have rejected well-deserved pardons that were not
marred by inadequate information?57
It is impossible to say how the Mississippi pardons and commutations
would have fared if all 214 had been reviewed by the courts for compliance
with the publication requirements of the Mississippi Constitution. However,
based on what has occurred in other jurisdictions, fears that judicial review
will result in the wholesale invalidation of clemency grants appear to be
more theoretical than real.
Thus far, courts have simply not been eager to invalidate clemency
grants of any kind, either at the state or federal level. The Supreme Court
has only once overturned a presidential pardon.58 With respect to judicial
review of state clemency processes on federal constitutional grounds, the
Court has left the door open for possible intervention, but just a tiny crack.
Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurrence in Woodard emphasized that
clemency decisions “have not traditionally been the business of courts.”59
Although she recognized that “some minimal procedural safeguards apply
to clemency proceedings,” she suggested that this would only warrant judi-
cial intervention in the face of wholly arbitrary clemency practices such as
decisions made by the toss of a coin.60 Given this demanding standard, it is
not surprising that the Court has never invalidated a state grant of clem-
ency.61 Indeed, the Court in Woodard upheld Ohio’s clemency practice
57. Indeed, the majority of Barbour’s grants went to persons who had been released from jail
and whose applications had been approved by the Mississippi Parole Board. Yet if the Mississippi
courts had chosen to review challenges to all of Barbour’s grants of clemency based on the lack of
compliance with the Constitution’s publication requirement, it seems likely that some legitimate
grants of clemency would have been thrown out too. See Patrik Jonsson, Did Haley Barbour
Overlook Mississippi Constitution Before Mass Pardon, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2012,
at 16 (noting that Barbour had defended the grants because “the state parole board had already
approved release of ninety percent of those pardoned, that the majority of them had already been
released, and that his main goal was to restore voting and even hunting rights for Mississippians
who had paid their price to society”).
58. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 95.
59. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (citation omitted).
60. Id. (suggesting that judicial intervention might be warranted by a scheme where a State
official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or if the State arbitrarily denied a
prisoner “any access” to its clemency process).
61. However, the Court summarily reversed a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit invalidating two commutations issued by the Governor of Tennessee. See Rose v.
Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21–22 (1975).
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without even a remand to apply Justice O’Connor’s “minimal procedural
safeguards” standard.62
State courts have also been reticent about using their power to undo or
limit executive clemency. For example, in State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward,
the Ohio Supreme Court did reject one of Governor Celeste’s pardons, but
it still declined to invalidate the controversial death penalty commutations
that had originally spawned the challenge to the governor’s authority.63
Thus, Maurer overall was a significant vindication of the governor’s clem-
ency authority. Similarly, in Gulley v. Budd, a case sometimes cited as
showing that the clemency power can be limited by the courts,64 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court asserted its authority to review “the Governor’s power
to act” with regard to clemency, but held that the pardon challenged by the
prosecuting attorney was valid.65 In Colorado, although the court invali-
dated a pardon, it did so at the request of sitting Governor Richard Lamm,
who sought to rescind the grant of clemency made by his lieutenant gover-
nor while Lamm had been absent from the state.66 Thus, judicial invalida-
tion of the pardon was actually a means of reinforcing the broad clemency
authority of Colorado’s governor.
62. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289–90.
Post-Woodard, Chief Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by four other justices, stated that
non-capital defendants “cannot challenge the constitutionality of any procedures available to vin-
dicate an interest in state clemency.” Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009). Thus it is possible to argue that a majority of the Court no longer accepts
Justice O’Connor’s view that “minimal” procedural protections apply to state clemency processes,
at least in non-capital cases. However, because Justice Robert’s opinion does not overrule or even
refer to Woodard and disposes of the clemency issue in two sentences, it is likely that Justice
O’Connor’s approach in Woodard is still good law, as one lower court has assumed. Link v.
Nixon, No. 2:11–CV–4040, 2011 WL 529577, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2011) (citation omitted)
(stating that “some minimal due process protections apply to a State clemency proceeding”).
63. 644 N.E.2d 369 (Ohio 1994). As Chief Justice Moyer explained in the concurring opin-
ion, this was not because the justices in the majority agreed with the Governor’s unpopular death
penalty commutations, but because they felt constrained not to interfere with the broad constitu-
tional authority of the Governor to grant clemency:
We are not required or even requested to review the wisdom or the judgment of the acts
of Governor Celeste when he pardoned and commuted the sentences of the defendants
two business days before he left office. If that were the issue, my vote would be to
invalidate all of the Governor’s actions. That, however, is not the issue we are required
to decide. Nor is there any dispute that even if the Governor were required by the
[c]onstitution and the statutes to receive a report from the Ohio Adult Parole Authority
before granting a pardon or commutation, he could disregard the recommendation con-
tained in the report and grant the pardon or commutation. Indeed, the manner in which
Governor Celeste granted the commutations and pardon in the cases before us suggests
that even if he had followed the statutory procedure, it is unlikely he would have fol-
lowed a recommendation of the Adult Parole Authority that any of the defendants not be
granted a commutation or pardon. It appears that that is precisely the reason the dissent
advocates an amendment to the [c]onstitution that would limit the power of the Gover-
nor to grant pardons, commutations, and reprieves.
Id. at 380.
64. In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 421 n.77 (Miss. 2012) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
65. 189 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Ark. 1945).
66. People ex rel. Garrison v. Lamm, 622 P.2d 87 (Colo. App. 1980).
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What these decisions show is that if anything, judicial review has
rarely resulted in courts placing limits on the executive clemency power.
Rather, judicial review is an exceptional remedy, the contours of which
must be carefully delineated in order to be successfully invoked. This, then,
is the crux of the question regarding judicial review: What sorts of claims
regarding clemency are properly reviewable by the courts?
III. WHAT TYPES OF CLAIMS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE JUDICIARY?
If we are to take them at their word, courts are willing to review grants
of executive clemency that violate or undermine another provision of the
Constitution. The Court in Schick v. Reed67 repeatedly stated that the presi-
dent may issue commutations in a manner “which does not otherwise of-
fend the Constitution.”68 Burdick69 saw the Court invalidating a presidential
pardon in order to “preserve” the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against
self-incrimination.70 Five Justices in Woodard concluded that state clem-
ency processes must provide at least minimal due process protections.71
However, in practice, it seems likely that the judiciary will only counte-
nance claims of constitutional violation when the remedy sought is one that
the courts are comfortable providing, such as invalidation of clemency
grants, or perhaps enjoining a particular manner of exercising the power.72
As Samuel Morison has observed regarding the federal authority, “the
Achilles’ heel in subjecting clemency decisions to judicial review is in fash-
ioning an adequate remedy, since a court can neither enjoin the president to
issue a pardon or grant ‘equitable’ relief on its own authority.”73
Under the U.S. Constitution, there are four possible types of challenges
that provide a plausible basis for judicial review of the clemency power.
First, a presidential grant of clemency could be set aside for violating the
only express limitation set forth in the Constitution, that a pardon cannot be
issued “in Cases of Impeachment.” 74 Second, clemency grants by presi-
dents or governors might be declared invalid because they infringe on fun-
67. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
68. Id. at 264, 266–67.
69. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
70. Id. at 93–94.
71. Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998).
72. The Supreme Court has not imposed any restrictions on state or federal clemency prac-
tices. However, the lower federal courts have sometimes found egregious state clemency practices
to violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (enjoining an
execution based on a claim that the state had violated due process by preventing the governor
from obtaining truthful information that was relevant to commutation request).
73. Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
253, 288 (2010); see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (arguing that federal
courts do not have inherent authority to relieve prisoners from the imposition of punishment be-
cause that right “belongs to the executive department”).
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (giving the president the power to grant pardons and reprieves,
for “Offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment”).
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damental rights, such as free speech or reproductive freedom. Third, the
courts could provide relief if clemency were granted or denied in violation
of equal protection principles by discriminating on the basis of race or gen-
der. Finally, clemency practices could be modified or enjoined by the courts
for failing to provide minimal due process protections. These issues are
discussed below.
A. Clemency Granted in Cases of Impeachment
The drafters of the Constitution, following the model of the British Act
of Settlement of 1700, sought to prevent the president from using the clem-
ency power to interfere with the process of impeachment.75 Alexander
Hamilton originally proposed that a supreme executive “have the power of
pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without
the approbation or rejection of the Senate.”76 The Report of the Committee
of Detail gave the president the power to grant reprieves and pardons, but
instead of excepting treason, provided that presidential pardon “shall not be
pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment.”77 This language was shortened to its
present form—authorizing clemency “except in cases of impeachment”—
without reported debate.78
There are two ways in which a pardon, granted in a case of impeach-
ment, might come before a court. First, a person who had been impeached
and removed from office could seek a pardon in order to preclude prosecu-
tion for whatever crime had precipitated his impeachment and removal
from office.79 President Nixon reportedly considered pardoning himself
prior to his resignation from office, presumably to prevent his subsequent
prosecution for any violations of federal law that he may have committed.80
The U.S. Constitution permits pardons prior to conviction and if Nixon had
pardoned himself, and had thereafter been removed from office via im-
peachment, he may have sought to invoke his pardon as a bar to his subse-
75. See generally Kobil, supra note 1, at 588–90 (discussing the history of the clemency R
power).
76. Neither the Virginia Plan, proposed by Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787, nor the New
Jersey Plan, proposed by William Paterson on June 15, 1787, provided for the granting of clem-
ency. The first reference to pardoning was made by Alexander Hamilton. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 292. (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter M. FARRAND].
77. Id. at 171–72.
78. See id. at 411, 419–20.
79. Article II, § 4, of the U.S. Constitution states that all officers of the United States can be
removed from office upon impeachment for and conviction of “Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Article I of the Constitution also provides that a successful impeach-
ment can only result in removal and disqualification from holding future federal office, but that
the convicted party “shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
80. It is unclear whether this would have been constitutional. See Brian C. Kalt, Pardon
Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 779 (1996);
Strasser, supra note 33.
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quent indictment and prosecution. In such a situation, the court presiding
over the subsequent prosecution would likely have had to decide whether
the pardon prevented Nixon’s prosecution.
Given that the exception for “cases of impeachment” is the only tex-
tual limitation on the president’s clemency power, a court could well have
refused to give effect to a pardon pleaded as a bar to prosecution in such a
situation. It could be argued that the intent of the Framers was to prevent
presidents from using pardons as a bar to impeachment and removal, not as
a bar to subsequent prosecution. However, the fact that the drafters of Arti-
cle II specifically rejected the Committee of Detail’s language that a pardon
“shall not be pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment,” and replaced it with the
broader prohibition that clemency may not be granted “in cases of impeach-
ment,” suggests otherwise. Even if the Framers broadened the impeachment
language for stylistic rather than substantive reasons,81 the “in Bar of an
impeachment” limitation historically meant that a pardon could not prevent
subsequent prosecution. According to Blackstone, “the king’s pardon can-
not be pleaded to any such impeachment, so as to impede the inquiry, and
stop the prosecution of great and notorious offenders.”82 Moreover, in Ex
parte Garland, one of the most expansive interpretations of the clemency
power ever issued, the Supreme Court stated that the president’s authority
“is unlimited, with the exception [of cases of impeachment.]”83 Thus, it
seems unlikely that the courts would allow a pardon to be used to prevent
subsequent prosecution in cases where an office holder has been impeached
and removed from office.84
The “cases of impeachment” limitation could also be triggered if the
president were to grant a pardon prior to conviction in an attempt to derail
an ongoing impeachment. The president might, by pardoning the underlying
offense constituting “high crimes and misdemeanors,” attempt to eliminate
the basis for the impeachment. Suppose, for example, that the House voted
to impeach and remove a member of the president’s administration for sus-
pected violations of federal law. If, while the impeachment trial was pend-
ing, the president pardoned the official for all possible federal crimes he
may have committed, could the official then ask a federal court to enjoin
the impeachment trial on grounds that any impeachable offenses had been
erased by the pardon?
81. See Louis Sirico, Jr., How the Separation of Powers Doctrine Shaped the Executive, 40
U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 640 n.198 (2009) (suggesting that the change in language was “more
felicitous”).
82. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 392 (1979) (second emphasis added).
83. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (emphasis added).
84. Thus it may have been quite prudent for President Nixon to resign, as he did, prior to
impeachment and removal from office. If he actually had been impeached, President Ford’s full
pardon likely would not have prevented Nixon’s subsequent prosecution for violations of federal
law.
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While it might seem that such a use of the pardon power is plainly
prohibited by the “in cases of impeachment limitation,” the courts could
well decline to resolve the question of whether such a pardon is valid. In
Nixon v. United States, where a federal judge sought a declaration that the
Senate had violated its obligation to “try” all impeachments, the Court in-
voked the political question doctrine to hold that “the Judiciary, and the
Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeach-
ments.”85 According to the Court, “[j]udicial involvement in impeachment
proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, . . . would evis-
cerate the ‘important constitutional check’ placed on the Judiciary by the
Framers.”86 This recognition of broad congressional supremacy with re-
spect to the impeachment process has caused commentators to conclude
that Congress, not the courts, would have the final say in concluding what
constitutes impeachable offenses.87 By similar reasoning, Congress would
be the proper body to determine whether such a pardon had been issued in
“cases of impeachment,” and whether the impeachment could proceed not-
withstanding the pardon. In such a situation, the judiciary presumably
would decline to intervene to decide the effect of the pardon, and would
instead defer to Congress to decide whether the pardon could stop the im-
peachment proceedings.
B. Clemency Grants that Undermine Fundamental Rights
The judiciary could also invalidate a grant of clemency that denied or
significantly interfered with fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Such interference with a fundamental right could occur directly, as in
Burdick,88 where the Court invalidated a presidential pardon that had been
issued to prevent the recipient from exercising his Fifth Amendment right
against compelled testimony.89
It is also possible that the courts would review a grant of clemency
where an executive indirectly interfered with fundamental constitutional
rights by making their surrender a condition of an applicant receiving clem-
ency. An executive might, for example, insist that those seeking a pardon
agree to give up their right to vote, to bear arms, or to resist suspicion-less
85. 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 235.
87. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82–88 (1989) (arguing that Congress properly may define those “political
crimes” which constitute impeachable offenses); see also L. Darnell Weeden, The Clinton Im-
peachment Indicates a Presidential Impeachable Offense is Only Limited by Constitutional Pro-
cess and Congress’ Political Compass Directive, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2499, 2502–03
(2001) (“At the end of the impeachment day, an impeachable offense is defined by the political
realities of an appropriate majority of the members of Congress and all the Constitution requires is
that the important decision be justified as a serious political offense.”).
88. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26, for a more comprehensive discussion of
Burdick.
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searches as a condition of receiving clemency.90 The Supreme Court has
never answered the question of whether such a conditional grant of clem-
ency would be permissible, though the Court was presented with the issue
on one occasion.
In Woodard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
inmates had raised a colorable claim of unconstitutionality in their chal-
lenge to Ohio’s practice of requiring death row inmates applying for clem-
ency to participate in a private, uncounseled interview without a guarantee
of immunity.91 The Sixth Circuit had reasoned that such a procedure placed
death row inmates in the position of making “a ‘Hobson’s choice’ between
asserting the Fifth Amendment right and participating in the clemency re-
view process.”92 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s
holding, it did so without addressing the lower court’s unconstitutional con-
dition rationale.93
The only extended analysis by a court of whether a grant of clemency
could be predicated on relinquishing a fundamental right is found in a dis-
trict court opinion in a case initiated by Jimmy Hoffa, former president of
the Teamster’s union.94 Hoffa had been convicted of various federal of-
fenses including jury tampering, mail and wire fraud, and of conspiracy to
defraud a Teamster’s Union pension fund.95 In 1971, just prior to Christ-
mas, President Richard Nixon commuted Hoffa’s sentence subject to the
following condition: “that the said James R. Hoffa not engage in direct or
indirect management of any labor organization prior to March sixth,
1980.”96 Hoffa was released and thereafter instituted an action in federal
district court challenging the constitutionality of the commutation condi-
tion, alleging among other things that it infringed on his First Amendment
rights of speech and association.97
90. For an excellent, more extensive discussion of the issue of presidential conditional par-
dons, please see Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (2001).
91. 107 F.3d 1178, 1193 (6th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
92. Id. at 1189.
93. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 285–88 (“While the Court of Appeals accepted respondent’s rubric
of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ we find it unnecessary to address it in deciding this case [be-
cause] the procedures of the Authority do not under any view violate the Fifth Amendment
privilege.”).
94. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974).
95. Id. at 1223.
96. Id. at 1224.
97. Hoffa also argued that the condition imposed by the president was invalid because it had
been formulated as the result of a conspiracy involving Nixon, Charles Colson, and Teamster’s
union president Fred Fitzsimmons. Id. at 1225. However, the court refused to inquire into the
president’s reasons for issuing the pardon to Hoffa. Id. The court stated that even if Hoffa were
correct that Nixon, in order to gain political advantage, had conspired with Teamsters officials to
keep Hoffa out of the union, improper motives could not invalidate the commutation. Id. The
court reasoned that, just as an act of Congress may not be attacked on the ground that the legisla-
tors who voted for its passage did so for improper reasons, so too is even the corrupt use of the
presidential pardoning power insulated from judicial review. Id.
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The district court ultimately rejected Hoffa’s unconstitutional condi-
tion argument, but did recognize that in at least some circumstances, condi-
tions imposed on a grant of clemency could violate the Constitution and be
subject to invalidation by the judiciary. According to the court, the “frame-
work of our constitutional system” establishes “limits beyond which the
President may not go in imposing and subsequently enforcing . . . condi-
tions” on clemency.98 Thus, the court held that an executive may not use a
conditional pardon in a way that is not “directly related to the public inter-
est” or in a way that will “unreasonably infringe on the individual com-
mutee’s constitutional freedoms.”99 Relying on an amicus brief filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Court offered one example of such an
unconstitutional condition on clemency: “a condition requiring the com-
mutee to forego supporting any candidate for political office, except the
President who commuted his sentence . . . would clearly” be unconstitu-
tional.100 Nevertheless, in applying its newly minted test to Hoffa’s condi-
tional commutation, the court was deferential, holding that the condition to
forego union leadership was related to the public interest when tested under
a “reasonableness” standard, and did not violate Hoffa’s free speech rights
because of the substantial governmental interest in preserving the integrity
of labor organizations.101
Although no other court has applied the Hoffa standard in the context
of a pardon or commutation, analogous decisions regarding conditions im-
posed on parole and bail suggest that the court was correct that some condi-
tions imposed on otherwise discretionary grants of clemency will be
invalidated by courts as unconstitutional. For example, while courts gener-
ally have broad latitude in placing restrictive conditions on bail,102 they
may not impose conditions that deny basic First Amendment rights. Thus,
when the government seeks to deny or revoke bail because the defendant
may advocate ideas of which the government disapproves, courts some-
times reject such conditions as unconstitutional.103 As Justice Jackson, sit-
98. Id. at 1234–35.
99. Id. at 1236. The district judge fashioned this standard without reference to any Supreme
Court decisions, relying on a handful of decisions from lower federal courts and state courts which
suggested that the executive could only impose conditions that were not “illegal or against public
policy.” Lupo v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1937); see also Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49,
51 (10th Cir. 1930).
100. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1234–35 n.48 (D.D.C. 1974).
101. Id. at 1237–40.
102. E.g., United States v. Smith, 444 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir. 1971) (noting that the courts have
the inherent power to place restrictive conditions upon the granting of bail).
103. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Means v. Solem, 440 F. Supp. 544 (D.C.S.D. 1977) (invalidating bail
condition that required defendant to refrain from participating in most American Indian Move-
ment activities); Leary v. United States, 431 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that bail condition
that would prevent defendant from engaging in “mere advocacy” of illegal drug use would impose
an unconstitutional condition); Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282–83 (2d Cir. 1950)
(holding that court could not revoke bail based on government’s argument that speech advocating
Communism was subversive).
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ting by designation on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
reasoned:
If the courts embark upon the practice of granting or withholding
discretionary privileges or procedural advantages because of ex-
pressions or attitudes of a political nature, it is not difficult to see
that within the limits of its logic the precedent could be carried to
extremities to suppress or disadvantage political opposition.104
In similar fashion, the courts have occasionally used the unconstitu-
tional condition rationale to limit the terms placed on parole or probation.
Generally speaking, the government may impose conditions on parole or
probation, even if they require the surrender of constitutional rights.105 For
example, when good reason exists to do so, it is not unusual to subject
parolees to warrantless searches or random drug testing, despite the fact that
the Fourth Amendment would ordinarily preclude such government action.
Courts have generally upheld such conditions on release.106
Despite this broad latitude, conditions on probation or parole that deny
certain fundamental rights, and are not clearly related to important govern-
mental interests, have sometimes been invalidated. Courts may not condi-
tion probation on the defendant giving up her right to procreate or travel, at
least where such conditions are not reasonably related to the government’s
legitimate interests in public safety or preventing recidivism.107 Moreover,
conditions on release that burden fundamental rights based only on a
judge’s “idiosyncrasies” are disfavored and may be invalidated.108
104. Williamson, 184 F.2d at 283.
105. See generally State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 210 n.27 (Wis. 2001) (cataloguing pro-
bation conditions that require the surrender of fundamental rights).
106. E.g., Cusamano v. Alexander, 691 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding constitu-
tionality of parole conditions requiring parolee to participate in drug and alcohol abuse treatment
programs, refrain from consuming alcohol or frequenting establishments that serve alcohol, refrain
from driving or obtaining a driver’s license, abide by a curfew established by his parole officer,
participate in anger management counseling, and comply with any geographical restrictions im-
posed by parole officer); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009) (upholding as reasonable a
parole condition requiring that the parolee submit to warrantless searches because of the dimin-
ished privacy interests, the goals sought to be attained by early release, and society’s interest in
protecting against recidivism).
107. E.g., State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (invalidating as unconstitu-
tional infringement on right of privacy a probation condition prohibiting defendant from becoming
pregnant during term of her probation); State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 2000) (invalidat-
ing as unrelated to rehabilitation and public safety probation condition excluding probationer from
“the entire City of Minneapolis”); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)
(invalidating as unconstitutional a parole condition requiring the defendant, who had been con-
victed of felony child abuse, to refrain from having another child for two years); see also State v.
Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515–16 (Minn. 1989) (noting that conditions of probation must be
reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing and must not be unduly restrictive of the proba-
tioner’s liberty or autonomy, especially where fundamental right is implicated).
108. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206 (noting that judges “abuse their discretion by imposing pro-
bation conditions on convicted individuals that reflect only their own idiosyncrasies [and should
impose] probation conditions to further the objective of rehabilitation and protect society and
potential victims from future wrongdoing.”).
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In the clemency context, as with other unconstitutional conditions
cases, it is difficult to identify with precision the conditions that would actu-
ally be invalidated by the judiciary. 109 Nevertheless, the Hoffa court’s ex-
ample, coupled with the cases in which bail or probation conditions have
been invalidated, suggest that if a condition were imposed that unreasona-
bly advanced the executive’s own interests or idiosyncrasies in violation of
a fundamental right, the courts could properly invalidate the conditional
aspect of the executive’s grant of clemency.110 For example, if the president
commuted or pardoned a sentence based on a condition that the recipient
donate money to the president’s reelection campaign or presidential library,
it is difficult to imagine that the courts would uphold such a condition de-
spite the Hoffa court’s recognition that First Amendment activities can
sometimes be curtailed as a condition of clemency.
But what about conditions that do not so obviously benefit the execu-
tive, but nevertheless implicate fundamental rights? Again, the executive
actions of former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour provide us with an
intriguing example to consider. In 2010, Barbour indefinitely suspended the
sentences of two sisters who had been incarcerated for robbery, thereby
releasing them from prison, but only on the condition that one sister donate
a kidney to her ill sibling.111 This might be seen as an instance of condi-
tional release for the public good (Barbour noted that it saved the state the
109. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has long been criticized by commentators
because of its inconsistent, ad hoc application by courts. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1009–13 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the perplexing in-
consistency of the Supreme Court decisions applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (concluding
that the Supreme Court in applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has worked more by
hunch and intuition than by systematic theory). Thus, even if the courts are willing to review a
grant of clemency because the recipient has been required to give up a fundamental right, it is
impossible to say with certainty which kinds of conditions would ultimately be found to be
unconstitutional.
110. For a thoughtful argument that the Hoffa court is incorrect and that “the president’s
choice of conditions largely should escape judicial review,” see Krent, supra note 90, at 1716.
Professor Krent addresses only presidential conditional grants of clemency, not gubernatorial
ones, and he is certainly correct that the courts ought to be “reluctant to interfere with presidential
discretion except in the rarest of circumstances.” Id. Nevertheless, to the extent that he relies on
“consent” of the clemency recipient to be a check on overreaching by the president, I believe that
he asks too much of those placed in the position of bartering for their freedom, using fundamental
rights as a bargaining chip. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that consent to clemency is not
required—a conditional commutation could presumably be imposed over the objection of the
prisoner. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 488 (1927) (“Just as the original punishment
would be imposed without regard to the prisoner’s consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he
liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent determines what shall be done [regarding a
commutation].”).
111. Krissa Thompson, Prison Release “Conditioned on” Kidney Donation, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR20101230
04722_pf.html.
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cost of daily dialysis treatments),112 or as an instance of monarch-like idio-
syncrasy, since Barbour could have saved the state money by simply releas-
ing the ailing sister without any requirement that her healthy sister donate a
kidney. He justified the suspended sentences because the sisters “no longer
pose a threat to society,”113 but nevertheless imposed the condition of a
kidney donation, thereby turning “what had been a gift into compensa-
tion.”114
One can readily imagine similar conditions being imposed on grants of
clemency that implicate fundamental liberties: commutations might be of-
fered in exchange for inmates agreeing to participate in medical experi-
ments, undergo voluntary sterilization,115 or perform hazardous work for
the state.116 In the Mississippi case, since the Scott sisters will remain on
parole for the rest of their lives, the State of Mississippi could seek to re-
incarcerate Gladys Scott if she does not donate her kidney in timely fash-
ion.117 Under such circumstances, if a clemency recipient could demon-
strate that the specific condition imposed by the executive burdened a
fundamental right without adequately advancing the public interest, the ar-
guments for judicial intervention would seem compelling even under the
Hoffa court’s lenient standard.118
C. Clemency Grants that Deny Equal Protection of the Law
Judicial review of clemency grants may also be appropriate where
clemency is dispensed in a manner that violates equal protection principles.
As Dafna Linzer and Jennifer LaFleur have reported, there has been a pro-
112. Timothy Williams, Jailed Sisters Are Released for Kidney Transplant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08sisters.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
113. According to Barbour, the conditional release was justified for the following reasons:
The Mississippi Department of Corrections believes the sisters no longer pose a threat to
society. . . . Their incarceration is no longer necessary for public safety or rehabilitation,
and Jamie Scott’s medical condition creates a substantial cost to the State of Missis-
sippi. . . . Gladys Scott’s release is conditioned on her donating one of her kidneys to her
sister, a procedure which should be scheduled with urgency.
Thompson, supra note 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Williams, supra note 112.
115. See State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985) (invalidating as contrary to public policy
suspension of 30-year jail sentences conditioned on defendants agreeing to be castrated and suc-
cessfully completing the surgical procedure).
116. See Stu Whitney, Janklow Made Nearly 2,000 Sentence Commutations, ABERDEEN AM.
NEWS, Jun. 30, 2003, at 7A (describing Governor Bill Janklow’s system of commuting the
sentences of inmates for “responding to tornadoes, floods and windstorms”).
117. Williams, supra note 112 (noting that many uncertainties affect whether a transplant will
ever occur, given that the family cannot afford the procedure, it is unclear whether the sisters
qualify for Medicaid, the sisters may not have compatible tissue types, and after having spent so
many years in prison, neither sister may be healthy enough to undergo the transplant procedure).
118. See Krent, supra note 90, at 1693–94 (2001). Interestingly, despite his general resistance
to judicial review of presidential clemency conditions, Professor Krent accepts that courts should
invalidate grants of clemency conditioned on the donation of a kidney because such bargains
“may cheapen the value of privacy and bodily integrity.” Id.
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nounced racial disparity in the granting of presidential pardons.119 Their
study of grants from 2001 through 2008 shows that “[w]hite criminals seek-
ing presidential pardons . . . have been nearly four times as likely to succeed
as minorities,” and that blacks have the poorest chance of receiving a par-
don.120 The racial disparity was especially apparent when particular pardon
applicants were compared:
An African American woman from Little Rock, fined $3,000 for
underreporting her income in 1989, was denied a pardon; a white
woman from the same city who faked multiple tax returns to col-
lect more than $25,000 in refunds got one. A black, first-time
drug offender—a Vietnam veteran who got probation in South
Carolina for possessing 1.1 grams of crack—was turned down. A
white, fourth-time drug offender who did prison time for selling
1,050 grams of methamphetamine was pardoned.121
Linzer and LaFleur’s work suggests that race could well have played a
role in pardon decisions. Although applications for presidential pardons do
not include information about the race of the applicant, racial information is
often listed in law enforcement documents. In addition, during the period of
the study, no black attorneys worked in the Office of the Pardon Attorney;
moreover, the Inspector General found that the head of the office had inap-
propriately used ethnic background as a ground to deny a pardon to an
African American.122 Finally, the Office of the Pardon Attorney had uti-
lized amorphous criteria such as an applicant’s “attitude” and “stability,” as
grounds for recommending pardons, an approach that effectively “ex-
clud[ed] large segments of society.”123
While there have been no comprehensive statistical studies of racial
disparities at the state level, there is also reason to believe that state clem-
ency practices are not always color blind. When former Mississippi Gover-
nor Haley Barbour issued 222 grants of clemency from 2008 to 2011, the
racial composition of the recipients was decidedly white. A study by
Reuters reports that about sixty-four percent of Barbour’s grants went to
119. Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Linzer and LaFleur recount that in 2007, the Office of the Pardon Attorney recommended
that a Brooklyn, New York, minister, Nigerian-born Chibueze Okorie, be denied a pardon. Id.
Then U.S. Pardon Attorney, Roger Adams, opposed clemency for Okorie, who faced deportation
because of a 1992 conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute. Id.
According to a report from the Justice Department’s Inspector General, Adams had said of
Okorie, “This might sound racist,” but Okorie is “about as honest as you could expect for a
Nigerian. Unfortunately, that’s not very honest.” Id.
Adams later justified his remark by stating that Nigerian immigrants “commit more crimes
than other people” and that an applicant’s nationality is “an important consideration” in pardons.
Id. The Inspector General’s report on the incident concluded, “Adams’ comments—and his use of
nationality in the decision-making process—were inappropriate.” Id.
123. Id.
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whites and thirty-one percent to blacks, despite the fact that sixty-five per-
cent of those imprisoned in Mississippi are black.124 These numbers do not
prove that invidious racial discrimination caused the disparity.125 Yet ac-
cording to statisticians who reviewed the data, “[t]he odds of a random sam-
ple of the prison population coming out with the same or greater disparity in
racial proportions as the pardons list is less than one in a trillion, if race
were truly unrelated to pardons.”126 Anecdotal evidence suggests that race
can sometimes be a factor in state clemency decisions.127
Gender likewise appears to be relevant in clemency decisions, particu-
larly in capital cases. Professor Heise’s statistical comparison of executions
and commutations in death penalty cases shows that women receive clem-
ency at a disproportionately high rate.128 He found that “[w]omen are sig-
nificantly more likely to receive clemency than men, even after controlling
for an array of background factors.”129 Although he does not believe that
his study alone supports a claim that states violate equal protection in the
granting of clemency based on gender, he encourages “litigants to examine
more closely specific states’ clemency processes and how these processes
intersect, if at all, with gender.”130
Racial and gender disparities are troubling in light of the obligation
executives have of complying with equal protection principles when dis-
pensing clemency.131 The Fourteenth Amendment by its terms prohibits
124. Factbox: Balance of Mississippi Pardons by Race, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:42PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-usa-mississippi-pardons-factbox-idUSTRE80J25R2
0120120.
125. Reuters quotes Jack Glaser, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of
California at Berkeley, who makes the point that the racial disparity, may have more complex
underpinnings than simple racial prejudice:
“There’s also a very good chance that black prisoners are less likely to apply for par-
dons,” Glaser said. “They’re more likely to be disenfranchised and less likely to have
financial means and so that could also be a source of the disparity. I guarantee that this
disparity has many, many causes.”
Himanshu Ojha, Marcus Stern & Robbie Ward, Insight: Mississippi Pardons Benefited Whites by
Big Margin, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:46PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-usa-
mississippi-pardons-idUSTRE80J25K20120120.
126. Id.
127. In South Carolina, Governor Coleman Blease described a pardon he granted in 1912 to a
murderer named William H. Mills, whom Blease pardoned to fulfill a campaign promise: “I took
the position that I was the servant of the people[,] . . . and when a community where a crime had
been committed, with the best people, the white people, signing the petition, said that the criminal
had been punished enough, I turned him out without regard to criticism.” James D. Barnett, The
Grounds of Pardon, 17 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 507 (1927) (quoting Modern
Penology, GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 36, 53 (1912)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Struc-
ture, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 277 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 278.
131. See Osborne v. Folmar, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] person may chal-
lenge a pardon or parole decision on equal protection grounds though he asserts a due process
claim that fails.”).
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states from denying equal protection of the law based on race and this pro-
hibition has been extended to state gender classifications as well.132 In simi-
lar fashion, the Supreme Court has applied the principle of equal protection
to the federal government, through the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.133 Moreover, the executive branch of the federal government
cannot discriminate in a manner that denies equal protection of the law,
even in performing discretionary functions such as prosecuting crimes.134
Thus, presidential clemency practices that purposely discriminated on the
basis of race presumably would also be subject to equal protection con-
straints, though the Supreme Court has never directly so held.135
Assuming that a colorable equal protection claim could be pleaded
against the president or a governor (undoubtedly a significant hurdle),136
what, if anything, could the courts do? First, it appears that the remedy that
would be most attractive to those who had been unlawfully denied clem-
ency is unavailable: the courts would be incapable of granting, or ordering
the executive to grant, a pardon or commutation.137 Although courts have
declared grants of clemency invalid,138 no court has ever ordered that clem-
ency be granted in a particular case. Such judicial action would undoubt-
132. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
133. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
134. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–09, 608 n.9 (1985) (holding that although the
executive has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute, a decision to selectively prosecute may
not violate “ordinary equal protection standards”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125,
126 n.9 (1979) (holding that selectivity in the enforcement of federal criminal laws is subject to
equal protection constraints).
135. See Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President’s Pardon Power, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 143, 153–54 (2003) (concluding that the president is subject to equal protection constraints
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has not directly spoken to this issue).
136. The studies discussed above, though clearly disturbing, would likely not be enough to
make out a viable equal protection claim under current law. The Linzer and LaFleur, Reuters, and
Heise studies all tend to show that clemency practices have a disparate impact based on race or
gender. However, the Supreme Court has held that discriminatory impact usually will not be
enough to show invidious discrimination. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976). Absent
a truly “stark” disparate effect on a group, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886),
those alleging discrimination on the basis of race or gender must also show discriminatory pur-
pose by the government. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (race); Pers. Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (gender); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (race). Given that presidents and governors would be ex-
tremely reluctant to acknowledge that race or gender had played a role in clemency decision
making, it would be difficult for litigants to satisfy the discriminatory purpose prong of an equal
protection claim. See also Strasser, supra note 135, at 153–56 (concluding that it would be very
difficult to establish a colorable equal protection claim against the president).
137. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (noting that federal courts do not have
inherent authority to relieve prisoners from the imposition of punishment because that right “be-
longs to the executive department”); Graham v. Angelone, 73 F. Supp. 2d 629, 629 (E.D. Va.
1999) (stating that clemency is a matter for the executive, not the judiciary); see also Morison,
supra note 73, at 287–88 (concluding that the courts cannot issue a pardon or order the president
to do so).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 49–58.
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edly raise insurmountable separation of powers concerns, whether directed
to the president or to the governor of a state.
However, it is well established that courts may enjoin discriminatory
conduct by federal and state officials that violate equal protection princi-
ples, and courts can also provide other forms of relief. As Professor Strasser
has observed, a court could “issue a declaratory judgment, for example, that
race cannot be a dispositive factor in the determination of whether a pardon
should be issued.”139
While these types of declaratory and injunctive relief might not imme-
diately benefit those denied clemency on the basis of a prohibited classifica-
tion, they could have significant, salutary effects on the clemency process in
the long run. Credible allegations of racial or gender discrimination could
prompt the president or a governor to reconsider his approach to making
clemency decisions. The Linzer and LaFleur report concerning the racial
disparity in presidential pardons, coupled with the apparent mishandling of
the commutation case of Clarence Aaron by the Office of the Pardon Attor-
ney, have reportedly prompted the Obama administration to conduct an in-
dependent study of how clemency has been dispensed.140 Moreover, a
lawsuit instituted to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief would allow for
further discovery regarding the executive’s clemency process, shedding
light on whether improper considerations have played a role in clemency
decisions. A judicial opinion citing an executive’s unconstitutional racial or
gender considerations in reaching a clemency decision could also have
powerful political repercussions. In an extreme case, a successful lawsuit
establishing purposeful, unconstitutional actions by the executive in dis-
pensing clemency might even constitute a basis for impeachment and re-
moval from office.141
D. Clemency Practices That Deny Due Process of Law
The Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled that clemency proce-
dures are indeed subject to the constitutional constraint of due process.
However, the Supreme Court has never ruled either a federal or state clem-
ency system to be unconstitutional. Moreover, the two cases in which the
139. Strasser, supra note 33, at 138–39.
140. Dafna Linzer, Commutation Request Will Get a New Look, WASH. POST, July 19, 2012,
at A03, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-wants-review-of-prisoners-commu-
tation-request.
141. Prior to impeaching President Andrew Johnson, Congress investigated his pardoning
practices by reviewing his bank accounts in a search for money he might have received in ex-
change for granting clemency. However, abuse of the pardon power did not appear as a charge in
the eventual indictment for Johnson’s impeachment. Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Par-
dons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power Been
Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (1976); see also 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 150–53 (1939) (describing the impeachment of
Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton for selling pardons).
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Court has considered the application of due process principles to clemency
suggest that the scope of judicial review is quite narrow.
In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,142 the Court rejected
the claim of an inmate that the state pardon board’s failure to provide him
with a written statement of reasons for denying commutation violated his
due process rights. A majority of the Court showed little sympathy for the
due process claim, reasoning that since the Board of Pardons had “unfet-
tered discretion” to grant clemency, the prisoner had at best a unilateral
expectation of commutation that was insufficient to create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.143 The Court also stated that “pardon and commu-
tation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such,
they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”144
In the wake of Dumschat, the Court considered the question of
whether clemency procedures could ever violate due process. In Wood-
ard,145 the Court rejected a challenge to Ohio’s clemency procedure for
death row inmates. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for four Justices,
sought to extend the holding of Dumschat to rule that a prisoner never has
an interest in obtaining clemency that is protected by due process: “the ex-
ecutive’s clemency authority would cease to be a matter of grace committed
to the executive authority if it were constrained by the sort of procedural
requirements that respondent urges.”146 However, a majority of the Court147
refused to accept this categorical rule. Justice O’Connor’s controlling con-
currence held instead that “some minimal procedural safeguards apply to
clemency proceedings.”148 She stated that courts should intervene in certain
extreme circumstances:
Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face
of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine
whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily
denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.149
However, Justice O’Connor concluded that Ohio’s procedure, which
provided for “notice of the [clemency] hearing and an opportunity to par-
ticipate in an interview, comports with Ohio’s regulations and observes
142. 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981).
143. Id. at 466–67.
144. Id. at 464.
145. 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998).
146. Id. at 285.
147. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion holding that due process applies to the clemency
procedures was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens, in dissent, also accepted Justice O’Connor’s view that due process protec-
tions apply to clemency. Id. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 289.
149. Id.
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whatever limitations the due process clause may impose on clemency
proceedings.”150
Since Woodard was decided, Justice O’Connor has left the Court and
it is unclear whether her view that due process protections apply to clem-
ency procedures would still command a majority. In District Attorney’s Of-
fice for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, Chief Justice Roberts wrote on
behalf of himself and four other Justices that “noncapital defendants do not
have a liberty interest in traditional state executive clemency” and so “can-
not challenge the constitutionality of any procedures available to vindicate
an interest in state clemency.”151 The Roberts’ opinion cites Dumschat to
support this categorical rule.152 Osborne suggests that, at least in non-capi-
tal cases, a majority of the Court may not accept Justice O’Connor’s view
that “minimal” due process protections apply to clemency procedures.153
However, it is uncertain that Osborne should be read this broadly.
First, unlike Woodard, Osborne did not present the Court with a challenge
to arbitrary clemency procedures, but instead sought recognition of a right
to DNA testing of evidence predicated on the prisoner’s claim of a pro-
tected liberty interest in actually obtaining clemency.154 Since Dumschat
held that state law ordinarily does not create a liberty interest in obtaining
clemency (as opposed to applying for or seeking clemency),155 the Osborne
majority correctly rejected the prisoner’s argument that his liberty interest
in being granted clemency supported a due process right to DNA testing.
However, Dumschat did not address the broader assertion made by Chief
Justice Roberts, that non-capital defendants cannot challenge “any proce-
dures” to vindicate an interest in state clemency. If the Court were con-
fronted by a truly arbitrary clemency procedure—say one “infected by
bribery, personal or political animosity, or the deliberate fabrication of false
evidence”156—it would be required to address a far more difficult case than
Osborne presented, and to grapple directly with the Woodard holding in
regards to minimal procedural safeguards.
Second, Justice O’Connor did not limit her controlling concurrence in
Woodard to capital cases. Inasmuch as the Osborne opinion does not over-
rule or even refer to Woodard, and disposes of the due process issue in two
150. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289–90 (1998).
151. 557 U.S. 52, 67–68 (2009) (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 52–75.
154. Id. at 67 (“Osborne argues that access to the State’s evidence is a ‘process’ needed to
vindicate his right to prove himself innocent and get out of jail.”).
155. See generally Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutation: Life, Lib-
erty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201 (1993) (differentiating between an
interest in seeking clemency and in obtaining clemency). However, one court of appeals has read
Osborne as foreclosing a claim that a prisoner has a liberty interest in meaningful access to state
clemency mechanisms. McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
156. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 290–91 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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brief sentences, it is fair to conclude that Justice O’Connor’s approach in
Woodard is still good law.157 Indeed, lower courts have assumed that
O’Connor’s Woodard approach controls, even post-Osborne.158
Nevertheless, even applying the Woodard rule, lower courts have sel-
dom found state clemency procedures to be unconstitutional. One of the
few cases finding a colorable constitutional claim under Woodard is Young
v. Hayes,159 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stayed an execution based on a potential denial of due process. In Young, a
death row prisoner alleged that the circuit attorney had deliberately inter-
fered with his efforts to present evidence to the governor by threatening to
fire a subordinate if she provided truthful information that supported the
inmate’s petition for clemency. The Eighth Circuit found that this allega-
tion, if proved, would constitute a denial of due process under Woodard:
Certainly the discretion of a governor to grant or deny clem-
ency is unlimited in any ordinary circumstances. No claim is ad-
vanced here that the petitioner has a “liberty interest” in the grant
of clemency or the right to any particular outcome when he seeks
it. The allegation is quite different. . . . The claim here is that the
State, acting through the Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis,
has deliberately interfered with the efforts of petitioner to present
evidence to the Governor. . . .
. . . Such conduct on the part of a state official is fundamentally
unfair. It unconscionably interferes with a process that the State
itself has created. The Constitution of the United States does not
require that a state have a clemency procedure, but, in our view, it
does require that, if such a procedure is created, the state’s own
officials refrain from frustrating it by threatening the job of a
witness.160
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also found that an inmate facing
execution had properly stated a claim of a violation of due process under
Woodard in asserting that the state had misled his counsel about the issues
to be considered in the clemency proceeding before the Governor.161 The
Ninth Circuit refused to vacate a temporary restraining order issued by the
157. It is also possible that Osborne means that prisoners who are not facing capital punish-
ment may never challenge clemency procedures on due process grounds, while death row inmates
are allowed under Woodard to do so. However, given that the Osborne Court did not justify or
even acknowledge establishing different rules for prisoners based on whether they have been
sentenced to death, it is premature to draw such a conclusion. No lower courts have resolved the
tension between Osborne and Woodard in this manner.
158. PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Woodard, 523 U.S. at
276) (observing that “the procedures by which a pardon is granted must comply with the Due
Process Clause”); Link v. Nixon, No. 2:11–CV–4040, 2011 WL 529577, at *4 (W.D. Mo. 2011)
(citing Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289) (holding that “some minimal due process protections apply to a
State clemency proceeding,” in a capital case).
159. 218 F.3d 850, 852–53 (8th Cir. 2000).
160. Id. at 853.
161. Wilson v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 161 F.3d 1185, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1998).
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district judge, delaying the execution of Jaturun Siripongs so that the trial
court could consider the due process claim.162
However, most claims of due process violations under Woodard have
been unsuccessful. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted
in Turner v. Epps,163 while it is “clear that some minimal due process safe-
guards do apply to clemency procedures. . . . these requirements really are
minimal.” Thus, due process is not violated if a state court denies a death
row inmate access to a psychiatric expert (paid for by the inmate), because
the lack of expert assistance does not foreclose the prisoner from applying
for clemency, “even if it does potentially result in a less effective and com-
pelling clemency petition.”164 The Kentucky Supreme Court has likewise
held that due process is not violated when the state refuses to allow an
inmate facing execution to interview prison personnel and other inmates in
order to prepare his clemency application.165
Apart from blatant interference with the clemency process akin to that
alleged in Young,166 courts are unwilling to allow Woodard to be used as a
vehicle for improving clemency procedures. The Woodard standard was
held not to be violated by Texas’ clemency process, which allegedly did not
follow applicable state law or its own regulations, provided inadequate no-
tice to prisoners of issues the clemency board would consider, and allowed
the clemency board to act in secrecy, refuse to hold hearings, provide no
reasons for its decisions, and keep no records of its actions. 167 In similar
fashion, Tennessee was held not to have denied due process to a death row
inmate through a clemency process in which the Board of Parole and Par-
dons was openly hostile to the witnesses the prisoner presented during
clemency proceedings, and the state allegedly presented false and fabricated
evidence opposing clemency.168 Nor is it a denial of due process for the
162. Richard Marosi, Siripongs Asks Davis, Court to Spare Life, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/feb/03/local/me-4461. The trial court ultimately allowed the exe-
cution to go forward after conducting a hearing and determining that the Siripongs’ constitutional
rights had not been violated. Id.
163. 460 Fed. App’x 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Woodard, 523 U.S. at 290–91
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
164. Id.
165. Baze v. Thompson, 302 S.W.3d 57, 58, 60 (Ky. 2010) (upholding the denial of Baze’s
due process claim because he had received the “minimal” procedural protections required under
Woodard). In Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 344–46 (6th Cir. 2011), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not consider the due process issue, but held that federal law did
not permit a district court to order state officials not to interfere with the gathering of information
in support of an indigent defendant’s state clemency application.
166. 218 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000).
167. Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344–45 (5th Cir. 1999).
168. Workman v. Bell, 245 F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2001). The court reasoned that it could
only give relief to Workman if there had been fraud on the court by the state, and at most, the
state’s alleged falsehoods constituted fraud on the Governor of Tennessee. Id. To the extent that
the Sixth Circuit appears to believe that a fraudulent clemency process does not state a colorable
due process claim, its holding is at odds with Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000). See
infra text accompanying notes 159–60.
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governor to announce that he will not consider granting clemency in capital
cases, generally.169
In short, the scope of judicial review of due process claims is narrow,
even under the Woodard standard. The state may not, as Justice O’Connor
states in her Woodard concurrence, adopt a patently arbitrary procedure for
dispensing clemency.170 Courts are also troubled by credible allegations
that the state has deliberately sought to undermine the integrity of the clem-
ency process. However, it appears that short of setting up a fraudulent pro-
cess, clemency procedures can indeed be “minimal.” Of course, any
executive who takes seriously the dispensing of clemency, particularly in
death penalty cases, would undoubtedly demand a thorough, fair clemency
process that provides as much information as possible, presented in a pro-
fessional manner.171 If, however, a jurisdiction sought to streamline the
clemency process such as by denying clemency petitioners a public hearing
or an opportunity to present evidence, litigants would face an uphill battle
to invalidate such procedures under Woodard’s “minimal” due process stan-
dard, at least as it has been interpreted up until now.172
CONCLUSION
In his classic film, Annie Hall, Woody Allen shares an old Borscht
Belt joke that also captures his paradoxical feelings about life:
There’s an old joke. Uh, two elderly women are at a Catskills
mountain resort, and one of ‘em says: “Boy, the food at this place
is really terrible.” The other one says, “Yeah, I know, and such
. . . small portions.” Well, that’s essentially how I feel about life.
Full of loneliness and misery and suffering and unhappiness, and
it’s all over much too quickly.173
This observation also captures the criticisms commonly leveled at the
mechanism of clemency: it can be “terrible” since it is often administered
poorly, and it is doled out in “small portions,” because clemency is granted
much too infrequently. Judicial review of clemency offers an attractive
means of improving the quality of clemency decision-making, though it will
169. Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2002).
170. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288–90 (1998).
171. See Brief of Current and Former Governors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2008) (No. 07-8521), 2008 WL 4264488 (advocating the appoint-
ment of counsel in death row clemency cases because of governors’ desire to “exercise the clem-
ency power in a manner that promotes fairness, accuracy, and public confidence in the criminal
justice system”).
172. But see Link v. Luebbers, 830 F. Supp. 2d 729, 732–33 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (reimbursing
attorneys in capital case for work challenging state clemency process under Woodard, characteriz-
ing issue of due process in clemency as “a developing area of law,” and noting that the ABA
Guidelines recommend that counsel be prepared to raise due process challenges in clemency
proceedings).
173. ANNIE HALL (Charles H. Joffe 1977).
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likely have little effect on the “small portions”—the atrophy of the power
that is apparent in the federal and other systems.
Judicial review can properly be used to enforce textual limitations on
the clemency power, such as the federal requirement that pardons may not
be issued in cases of impeachment. It should also be used to limit the ability
of executives to condition grants of clemency on the relinquishment of fun-
damental constitutional rights. Finally, it is appropriate for the courts, in
some circumstances, to review clemency practices that deprive applicants of
equal protection or due process of law. However, if clemency proponents
hope to utilize the courts to impel executives to actually use the power more
often, they will likely be disappointed. Only a powerful sense of personal
responsibility on the part of particular executives, or a swelling public
clamor for mercy instead of retribution, is likely to lead to greater use of the
clemency power by governors or presidents.
